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Concepts for Art History in a changing world 
 
 
 
In an article written in 2002 by the art historian T J Clark he confronted his own past with 
a self-recognition that he had failed to “get right” certain works of art that were 
compellingly “contemporaneous” in his earlier years1. This was not a mere personal 
reflection but something of a commentary on certain trajectories of art historical work. 
For Clark then, the work of the 1960’s with Warhol as an example could only be empty 
because it came to represent a failed project of art in modernity. In so far as art in 
modernism was caught between a fine line of critiques of spectacle and being part of, 
absorbed into the spectacle itself, it had nowhere else to go.  
 
This view with which Clark battled throughout his connection with the Situationists and 
informed to the point of “haunting” his books such as “The Painting of Modern Life Paris 
in the Art of Manet and his followers” and “Farewell to an Idea”2 appears to have 
infected more recent appraisals of contemporary art, commentators upon which cannot 
seem to shake off the aspirations of modernism. As Steve Edwards suggests in his recent 
review of Hal Foster, Rosalind Krauss, Yve-Alain Bois and Benjamin Buchloh Art since 
1900: Modernism, Anti-Modernism, Postmodernism3 “These writers seem more and more 
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to confuse their own lack of sympathy for contemporary art with the capitalist 
colonisation of the avant-garde. They just don’t like what the “young ones” are doing…”4  
 
I am interested in what lays behind this difficulty and whether a different approach to the 
object of art is required, one that offers a way beyond the modernist canon and the 
philosophy, which ultimately underpins art historical discourse.5  
 
 The impetus for Clark’s article was a work by the American video artist Tony Oursler, 
entitled The Influence Machine, a large- scale outdoor installation of a face projected onto 
a cloud of water vapour, apparently talking garrulously about the Internet. It seems to be 
a ghostly apparition unable to be laid to rest in the interminable, unstoppable and 
ultimately undeletable world of new technology. Clark’s question in the article is how 
visual artists can respond (in his terms critically) in a world that is already saturated with 
images. Clark’s answer, in part, is to recognise that the visuality of the present era, 
coupled as it is to the speed and rhythms of consumerism, is nevertheless still a culture 
attached to the word, even as this word is collapsed into “verbiage”. The fact that forms 
of knowledge still require an attachment to the word, however distorted, enables Clark to 
at least grasp a space for the dialectic with visuality and virtuality to keep awake, or is it 
re-awaken, the critical project to, in the words of Marx, “teach the petrified forms how to 
dance, by singing them their own song”.6 
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Zygmunt Bauman has characterised contemporary culture as “a culture of 
disengagement, discontinuity and forgetting” where social relations and civic society are 
largely propelled by “consumerist syndrome”.7 
 
According to Bauman, “‘consumerist syndrome’ applied to culture centres upon an 
emphatic denial of the virtue of procrastination, of the “delay of satisfaction’ precept-
those foundational principles of the ‘society of producers’ or ‘productivist society’”. 8  
 
It may indeed be hard to think how a “critical” culture of the image can find ways to do 
its work in such an “abbreviated” culture. And where the aesthetic is everywhere except 
it seems in art works, there is need to (re) think what might constitute a “legitimate” 
response when desire is both cut short and accelerated at the same time.  
 
Where a modernist social, cultural and political project was built upon the productive, 
substantialist human subject, arguably now the subject is not of substance but of moments 
and “its” pro-activity or creativity has to be grasped on that basis. Certain paradigms 
come to the fore suggesting the contemporary subject is a subject, not so much of the 
alienation and anguish the Clark still detected in Tony Oursler’s piece, but of a peculiar 
kind of (in) difference. At the same time the indifference born of consumerism is vastly at 
odds with the plight of those who are literally and damagingly displaced and abused. 
Arguments persist of course to demonstrate the cultural consequences of late capitalism, 
its social imaginary, its global stream of spectaculars of “information” and absence of 
centre. But insofar as these arguments are based upon models of representation and a 
 4
collective emancipation born of the collective of “industrial”, alienation, the question is 
whether they can still hold up against the plurality, fragmentation and absence of sense 
that is our world. 
 
The “form”, modes or vocabulary by which to think the subject and “its” world have been 
overstepped of late. It is by now well known that there has been certain shift from a 
thinking of the subject centred in “being”-however radical or dialectised between being 
and production, being and time, being and nothingness (Marx, Heidegger, and Sartre), to 
a thinking outside of substantiated being all together, whether in “becoming” (Deleuze), 
the event (Badiou), the “open” or potentialities (Agamben). Derrida’s differ-ance and 
Nancy’s various conceptualisations of “exposure”, singular/plurality, spacing and touch 
belong here too, and it is their acknowledged debt and close reading of the “metaphysics” 
of modernity and a radicalised repositioning of ontology for contemporary contexts, that I 
aim to pursue here as a means to think another approach and a different conceptual space. 
 
Before doing so I make a brief return to one great thinker of modernity Walter Benjamin, 
precisely because of his unstinting engagement with what were the then new technologies 
of the visual and his exemplarity in attempting a thinking that, to return to Clark, 
“[would] take the forms of the present deeply inside itself, at the risk of mimicry, almost 
ventriloquism; but that out of that might come the possibility of critique, of true 
destabilization…”9 
 
 5
For Benjamin, the destruction of experience as holistic Erfahrung in the era of modernity 
with its production of commodities plucked from “context” and instantly archaic is 
double-edged. It disperses the conditions for the transmissibility of tradition, which 
Benjamin characterises as aura, but at the same time provides transformed opportunities 
for auratic perception. “The disconnected moments of lived experience, now free from 
tradition, lie available for new and potentially restrictive modes of recombination.”10 
 
This is why photography and film are so important for Benjamin, precisely because they 
are both within the “destructive” regimen of modern life but also can be understood in the 
critical context of new possibilities for perception.  
 
This is where the concept of “innervation” becomes so important for Benjamin. This is in 
sum, the transposition of the those mimetic impulses between the human body and “first 
nature” technology from more archaic times, the residue of which have now become 
individualised and fetishised, onto the plane of the collective experience of modernity. 
Here bodies are “automatonised” to the rhythms of modern urban life, including factory 
conditions, but such transposition can enable a “play” within those conditions, in the 
senses both of  “movement” dispersing the “automatic” responses demanded of modern 
conditions and the transforming possibilities of “play” as the sphere of non-
instrumentality within technology.  
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Miriam Hansen explains the significance of innervation for Benjamin first in terms of the 
context in which bourgeois culture had come to treat modern technology as “second 
nature”.  
 
 “Benjamin does not assume an instrumentalist trajectory [for technology] from mythical 
cunning to capitalist-industrialist modernity. The telos [of the] ... ‘domination of nature’ 
defines the second, modern technology only from ‘the position of the first’, which sought 
to master nature in existential seriousness, out of harsh necessity. By contrast Benjamin 
asserts [that the] “second technology rather aims at the interplay between nature and 
humanity. And it is the training, practicing of, rehearsal of this interplay that Benjamin 
pinpoints as the decisive function of contemporary art, in particular film...Film has the 
potential to reverse, in the form of play, the catastrophic consequences of an already 
failed reception of technology.11  
 
Technology was conceived, as “second nature” from the point of view of the domination 
of nature as an end in itself and “bourgeois culture had been complicit with that process 
by disavowing the political implications of technology, treating it as “second nature” 
while fetishizing an ostensibly pure and primary nature as the object of individual 
contemplation.”12  The point is to recognise the residual yield, the play and movement of 
photography and film as a means to reconnect with those mimetic impulses of non-
sensuous similarity, transposed to the context of the modern experience of the always 
potentially dispersed, moving “crowd”; to put the “play” or, in other terms, the 
heterogeneity of historical layers of perception, back into modern experience.  
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“…film offers a chance...to bring the apparatus to social consciousness, to make it public. 
“To make the technical apparatus of our time, which is second nature for the individual 
into a first nature for the collective, is the historic task of film.”...Innervation as a mode 
of regulating the interplay between humans and (second) technology can only succeed if 
it reconnects with the discarded powers of the first, with mimetic practices that involve 
the body as the “pre-eminent instrument” of sensory perception and (moral and political) 
differentiation...13 
 
The key to film lies in its constructed nature as a matrix of sequencing, inter-relating, 
editing and cutting of images. The medium of film matches the transitivity of technology 
as “second nature” but brings this into play with the distraction of its audiences, 
distraction being both an openness to new possible configurations of perception other 
than fixed co-ordinates and as Sam Weber suggests, as dispersion or strewn-ness,14 
connects with the way of being of the masses, such that technology and bodily 
innervation may come together.  
 
It is precisely in this sense that Benjamin reads technology through concepts, which are 
“completely useless for the purposes of Fascism” whilst being “useful for the formulation 
of revolutionary demands in the politics of art15.” Fascism is capable of harnessing 
“second-nature “technology for auratic ends. Fascism can “attempt to organise the masses 
without affecting property relations”, by “giving these masses not their right but their 
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chance to express themselves”.16  That chance comes most emphatically by way of “self-
expression”.  
 
Benjamin has been at pains to recognise the proletarian masses as necessarily “dispersed” 
by the “atomising” forces of modernity, whereby bodily organs are “disaggregated” into 
various “functions”. The point is not to disavow this by a “false consciousness” of an 
aggregated body, but to turn this around by recognition of a new topography of 
perception which demands an open field of politics which may shoot a star of hope across 
history.  
 
It is this difference between a consumerist pleasure in the image as an assumed “self”-
expression which Benjamin analyses to and in its extremis and a productive resistance to 
such assumptions which Benjamin captures through notions of “dispersal” and 
“distraction” as positive articulations of subject and image that interests me here. The 
conflict between the pervasiveness of the technological image giving us “back” an 
assumed expression of our selves and the potential to engage with such technology for 
critical intervention remains, but we have to think of it on the basis of a new premise.  
 
Insofar as Benjamin’s “dispersal” was premised upon a productive resistance based upon 
class divisions which presaged the overcoming of alienation to form a new totality it 
belonged an age of modernity which can no longer apply. It is on the basis of difference 
rather than totality that we a now required to think.  
 
 9
It is on this basis that Derrida will “divide” the time of technology. Nothing is more 
spectral than technology, but Derrida “divides” this spectrality between the unremitting 
speed and global scope of the apparition (that which characterises contemporary culture 
for Bauman) and the unpredictability and “out-of-time” of the “other-to-come” which 
crosses time which is the “other” mark of the spectral. For Derrida, hope is not in 
interrupting the pervasive unruly self-propelled course of technology in order to produce 
a new “programme” but in recognising how technology interrupts itself in its out-of-
jointed-ness and that within this “differ-ance” of technology, criticality and the 
“messianic” “to come” of justice emerges.  
 
Such hope is found in the interruptive “vibration” against whilst within the onslaught of 
the virtualisation of the tele-technological.  
 
“We have suggested that the event we are prowling around here hesitates between the 
singular “who” of the ghost and the general “what” of the simulacrum. In the virtual 
space of all the tele-techno-sciences, in the general dis-location to which our time is 
destined...the messianic trembles on the edge of this event itself. It is this hesitation, it has 
no other vibration, it does not live otherwise, but it would no longer be messianic if it 
stopped hesitating; how to give rise and to give place, still, to render it, this place, to 
render it habitable, but without killing the future in the name of old frontiers...”17  It is a 
question of whether art and the reading of it can assist in this. 
 
Arguably Nancy’s task has been to demonstrate how art can. 
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Nancy’s thought is important because it starts from the premise that there is an absence of 
sense, as formerly constituted on the basis of foundation, totalising concepts, signifier 
and signified or world-view and that insofar as there is culture it is a multiplicity of 
difference and insofar as there is community it is as singularities always already in plural 
relation to each other, touching but continually effracting, bifurcating, separating in their 
“ex-position”. Out of this Nancy thinks a new “creation” of sense, a sense of creation that 
hitherto representational and totalising theories have only repressed. 
 
Insofar as Benjamin was presenting a transformation of the bodily sensorium in which 
technology played its part and which technologies of photography and cinema critically 
(re) presented in a mimetic sense, Nancy traces the relationship between bodily sense and 
signifying discourses against the grain of our ultimate reliance upon a thinking of this in 
terms of representation and mimesis. At the heart of Nancy’s thinking is a “different 
demand of sense”.18 
 
 Insofar as fundamental ontologies as unifying principles, only serve to repress the 
multiple and fragmentary nature of the sense that the world is today, Nancy “allows” 
sense to emerge as “the multiple, fragmented and fragmentary real of the world to which 
thought is ceaselessly exposed at its limit.”19 Sense for Nancy takes us to a limit, which 
provokes a rupturing of signification; a rupturing of presence and on this basis we have to 
re-think an ontology and ethics of being in the world together. 
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This ontology is based upon the fragmentation of sense and the concept of self and 
community as a “singular plurality”.  
 
“…the analysis of existence is opened to the workings of a singularity that is always 
already in relation to a plurality of other singulars…subjectivity… happens in moments 
of encounter with each unique and irreducible other…community thus obtains in this 
plurality of singularities each existing on the basis of its relations with others, which 
makes it irreducible to systematic universal analysis…”20  
 
Like Derrida, Nancy will resist the totalising or programmable gesture but without falling 
into the potent individualism of the fragment. Singularity is always already at the same 
time a plurality of differ-ance which Nancy will press as distinctive ontology. Nancy is 
presenting a materiality which is figured as an exteriority of “spasmic” spacing in which 
the singularity of the subject’s existence takes place. As such it is exposed to other 
singularities in this “field” of plural spacing “prior to” any substantive identification. 
Insofar as identity is “inscribed” it is always already “ex-scribed” in this exposure. It is 
from this basis that we need to understand the importance for Nancy of “touch”.  Touch 
is the modality of sense that “embodies” the thinking of contact and separation/distance. 
Touching is the movement from exteriority, from the outside that involves both contact 
and separation/distance at the same time. In order for contact to take place there has to be 
exteriority and distance. It is modality that “presents” the limit of embodiment where 
embodiment “undoes”, exposed to exteriority 
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Within this “un-realm” of the plurality of sense and community the ethical demand of art 
is different. Art provides a singular experience of the fragmentation of sense and 
“worlding of plural worlds” in its capacity to interrupt and discontinue ideologies of 
“sense” and being.  
 
For Nancy artworks take the “worlding” of sense, the body as singular/plural 
contact/separation, technics and the modality of touch to a “second-power” by 
delineating, by presenting (not representing) the sense of sense, the presentation of sense, 
world as fragment. For Nancy, in their admixture of technicity and sense, artworks 
present “an exposure to an irreducible exteriority or being of sense…the-contact-in-
separation, touch, and exscription of sense.”21  
 
Going back to the Oursler we might say what matters is the particular “force” of the 
image, not its representational status or its evocation of the “word”, “as such”. It opens us 
to fragmentary nature (techniques, tracing, talk, vapour) that is our world without 
collapsing difference and in that intimate force of distance the space for criticality 
emerges.  
 
What Nancy presents is a move beyond and different to those ways of approaching the 
“image-like” and fragmentary nature of our world as it is, which have predominated to 
date. These approaches either seek to delve beneath or find alternative articulations to the 
fragmentary “surface” to find a material ground and production in a Marxian sense or 
posit a world of hyper-reality and surface spectacle out of which there is seemingly no 
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escape. The point is not to think art as bespeaking an alternative identification beneath 
the “specular play” of the image or to mourn this as now impossible, but to recognise the 
criticality of art in responding to the fragmentary demand to expose the fragility of 
signified sense.  
 
It is in this sense that the reified forms of the pervasive technological image are made to 
dance.  
Art can do this. We just need to read it differently. 
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